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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE STATE:
RESPONSES TO AND RATIONALES
FOR SPOUSAL BATTERING,
MARITAL RAPE & STALKING
KATImRIN' M. SCHELONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the home has traditionally been extolled as a safe haven
and marriage as the most venerable of our institutions, the reality for
women1 is that they are at far greater risk of being assaulted in their own
homes by a "loved one" than they are of being assaulted on the streets
by a stranger.2 In fact, it is recognized both nationally and internation-
ally that women are routinely raped, beaten, assaulted, and stalked by
current and former husbands or boyfriends.3
The statistics speak for themselves. In 1986 alone, a woman was the
victim of rape or attempted rape every 3 1/2 minutes.' Most rapes are
committed by non-strangers, that is, husbands or dates.5 Additionally,
approximately 200,000 people, the majority of whom are women, are
harassed by stalkers each year.6 Most stalking is related to domestic
violence and former intimate relationships. 7 Ninety percent of women
killed8 by husbands or boyfriends were stalked.9
* The author would like to thank Clinical Professor Laura Berend of the University of
San Diego School of Law for her invaluable comments and suggestions on this article, as well
as for her support and encouragement.
1. Although men can be victims of domestic violence and domestic violence can occur in
gay and lesbian relationships, studies have shown that women in heterosexual relationships
are victims of family violence at the rate of three times that of men and that of all crimes of
domestic violence, ninety-one percent were women victimized by their husbands or ex-hus-
bands. See PATSY A. KLAUs ET AL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FAMILY VIOLENCE 4
(April 1994). Therefore, the scope of this paper is limited to male-female domestic violence.
2. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Carol Stuart and the War on Women: What is the Legal Commu-
nity's Response?, 75 MASS. L. REv. 46, 47 (1990).
3. See Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights
Issue, 15 HUM. Rrs. Q. 36 (1993) (domestic violence is endemic to all societies, it is neither
unusual nor an exception to normal family life).
4. Schafran, supra note 2, at 48.
5. Id.
6. Nina Schuyler, No Place To Hide, CAL. LAW., June 1993, at 18, 18.
7. Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND.
L. RFv. 991, 995 n.32 (1993).
8. Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., Note, From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws,
68 NoTms DAME L. REv. 819, 838 (1993). ("The FBI's 1990 Supplemental Homicide Report
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Rape and assault victims usually see their attackers repeatedly before
the crime occurs. 10 In an analysis of the federal crime statistics from
1978-82, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence found that a
woman was assaulted by a partner every fifteen seconds." In 1991
alone, 21,000 domestic crimes against women were reported to the police
each week.12 Domestic violence is the single greatest cause of injury to
women each year.' 3 "More women are admitted to emergency rooms
after being battered by their partners than are treated for muggings, car
accidents and rapes combined."' 4 In addition, the severity of injuries
inflicted upon victims of spousal assault is significantly greater than the
injuries sustained by victims of assaults by strangers.15
Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that domestic violence is one of the
most under-reported and under-estimated crimes in the United States
today.'6 Some studies maintain that the actual number of incidents in
which a woman is battered could be as high as six million each year.' 7
reveals that while four percent of male homicide victims in 1990 were killed by their wives or
girlfriends, a staggering thirty percent of female homicide victims were killed by their hus-
bands or boyfriends.")
9. Guy, supra note 7, at 996.
10. Id.
11. Schafran, supra note 2, at 47.
12. Joseph R. Biden, Domestic Violence a Crime, Not a Quarrel, TRIAL, June 1993, at 56,
57 (statistics are based on an extensive survey of authorities across the nation conducted by
the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee). "Official government agencies charged with
collecting crime data, like the FBI, do not specifically include domestic violence in their yearly
national crime statistics." Id. at 57 n.5. Given that domestic violence, that is violence directed
towards woman, is so prevalent in our society, one must wonder why these statistics are not
gathered.
13. See id. at 56. 'Two U.S. surgeons general have stated domestic violence (not heart
attacks, cancer, or strokes) is the greatest threat of injury to women in this country. Id. at 56
n.2 and accompanying text.
14. Matthew Litsky, Note, Explaining the Legal System's Inadequate Response to the
Abuse of Women: A Lack of Coordination, 8 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 149, 149 (1990) (citing
Sheila A. Feeney, Getting the OP is Easy, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Sept. 3, 1989, at 54).
15. See Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women. A Critique and Pro-
posals for Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 78 n.27 (1983) (citing Deirdre A. Gaguin,
Spouse Abuse: Data from the National Crime Survey, 2 VICrIMOLOGY: INT'L J. 632, 640-41
(1977-78)).
16. See PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUsTicE STATISTICS, PREVENTING Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1 (1986) (an estimated 48% of domestic attacks against
women go unreported); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF
THumB: BATTERED WOMEN AND TaE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1 (1982) [hereinafter
RULE OF THUMB].
17. Stephen B. Reed, Note, The Demise of Ozzie & Harriet: Effective Punishment of Do-
mestic Abusers, 17 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 337, 338 (1991) (citing Jane
O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TImB, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23, 23).
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE STATE
Estimates suggest that in two-thirds of all marriages an episode of do-
mestic violence will occur at least once.'8
The history of domestic violence and marital rape reveals that these
offenses have been sanctioned and perpetuated by the criminal justice
system, itself a reflection of existing social attitudes. Although today
there are laws allowing prosecution of a husband or boyfriend who
abuses a wife or girlfriend,19 the legal system continues to treat these
abusers differently from other people accused of assault and battery.2 °
In many states marital rape is not treated as a crime, and in some states
has been expanded to include rape by boyfriends and social compan-
ions.21 "[D]espite increased national attention, domestic violence ...
remains the most prevalent crime in our society." 2 A review of data
shows that the response to cases involving domestic abuse by the crimi-
nal justice system, from the police to the courts, has been ineffectual and
inconsistent.
"[A] 1989 study in the nation's capital found that in over 85 percent
of the domestic violence cases where a woman was found bleeding from
wounds, police did not arrest her abuser." 3 Additionally, "[tihe U.S.
Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that half the incidents of domestic
violence classified as 'simple assaults' actually involved bodily harm as
serious or more serious than ninety percent of all rapes, robberies and
aggravated assaults."' Further, ninety percent of women killed by their
abusers have called the police at least once and fifty percent have called
18. Christopher J. Klein, Note, Will the § 1983 Equal Protection Claim Solve the Equal
Protection Problem Faced by Victims of Domestic Violence? A Review of Balistrer4 Watson,
Hynson, and McKee, 29 J. F m. L. 635, 636"(1990-1991) (citing Evan Stark et al., WIFE ABUSE
IN THE MEDICAL SETING: AN INTRODUCrION FOR HEALTH PERSONNEL, (Monograph Series
No. 7, National Clearing House on Domestic Violence 1981)).
19. id.; Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
7, 8 (1978).
20. Finesmith, supra note 15, at 75.
21. See infra p. 109-11.
22. Klein, supra note 18, at 636.
23. Biden, supra note 12, at 56 (citing Karen Baker et al., Joint Project, D.C. Coalition
Against Domestic Violence & Women's Law & Public Policy Fellowship Prog. at Georgetown
U. Law Center, Report on District of Columbia Police Response to Domestic Violence 44
(Nov. 3, 1989) (unpublished report, on file with Senate Commission on Judiciary)).
24. Schafran, supra note 2, at 47-48 (citing LANGAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 3).
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five or more times.' Of all women murdered, one-fifth had been previ-
ously attacked by their killer.2
The stereotypes, myths, and legal and social patterns that have influ-
enced police response to domestic violence are manifested in the courts
as well. As recently as the mid-1970s, every state exempted a husband
from prosecution for the rape of his wife.27 Studies show that in the ma-
jority of rape cases the better the victim knows the assailant, the less
chance there is that the assailant will be prosecuted. 28 Studies have also
found that rapes by acquaintances are two to five times less likely to
result in an indictment than rapes by strangers.29 Indeed, in most juris-
dictions throughout the United States and the world,30 spousal rape has
been a husband's right.31 Legislation often raises a shield of legal de-
fenses to protect men. 2
Women on the other hand have had fewer advantages: "Women vic-
tims may be doubly jeopardized if they try to protect themselves. A bat-
tered wife who kills her husband to protect the lives of her children or
herself is more likely to be convicted of murder than the husband who
beats his wife to death."'3 3 Some judges believe abused women are mas-
ochists or that they exaggerate the violence to punish "philandering hus-
bands or boyfriends," while others cling to an ideal of family privacy.'
25. Guy, supra note 7, at 996 (citing Anti-Stalking Legislation, 1992: Hearings on S.2922
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (unpublished statement of
Sen. William Cohen)).
26. See id. (citing Morning Edition: Anti-Stalking Laws Considered by Virginia (Nat'l Pub.
Radio broadcast, Mar. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File)).
27. Leigh Bienen, Rape III-National Development in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Wo-
MEN'S Ras. L. REP. 170, 185 (1980).
28. Women, Violence, and the Law: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Children,
Youth and Families, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Women, Violence and the Law]
(statement of Rep. George Miller).
29. Id. at 4 (fact sheet citing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987)).
30. See, e.g., R v. R [1991] 4 All E.R. 482 (abrogation of spousal rape exemption in Eng-
land); Michael D. Freeman, But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who(m) Can You Rape? The
Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 26 (1981)(discussion of spousal rape
exemption in France); Susan Maidment, Rape Between Spouses - A Case for Reform, 8 FAM.
LAW. 87, 89 (1978)(discussion of spousal rape exemption's recognition in England); Joanna L.
McFayden, Inter-Spousal Rape: The Need for Law Reform, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 193 (John M.
Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1978)(discussion of spousal rape exemption in Canada).
31. Martin D. Schwartz, The Spousal Rape Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7
VT. L. REv. 33, 33 (1982).
32. Id.
33. Women, Violence and the Law, supra note 28, at 2.
34. See Litsky, supra note 14, at 169-70; see also RULE OF T-omu , supra note 16, at 91.
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When viewed in relation to the modem view that women are no
longer chattel of men,3 5 but are equal to men, the theories justifying
rape, assault, and battery within the family should uniformly be con-
demned as archaic and wholly incompatible with current jurisprudence.
Yet assault, battery, and rape in marriage continue to be sanctioned by
law either through the lack of criminalization or the lack of arrest, prose-
cution, and sentencing. In order to appreciate the difficulties women
face within the legal system one must realize that the problems are not
simply inherent in or limited to the system.3 6 The problems are associ-
ated with the broader issues in American life of sexism,37 racism, and
capitalism. 38  Therefore, to view domestic violence as episodic or ran-
dom is to deny its full import.39
IX. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DoMIEsnc VIOLENCE
The history of domestic violence must be examined to understand the
reality of domestic violence today in all its forms and subtleties.4 ° The
roots from which spousal abuse has grown and flourished lie in the sub-
jugation of women in patriarchal societies4 and those institutions the
35. Trammel v. United States, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
36. Natalie J. Sokoloff & Barbara Raffel Price, The Criminal Law & Women, in THE
CRmsNAL JusrIcE SYSTEM AND WOMEN 10 (Barbara R. Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds.,
1982).
37. "Sexism is not merely the prejudice of individuals; it is embedded in the very eco-
nomic, legal, and social framework of life in the United States. The criminal justice system, as
one part of that institutional framework, reflects the same sexist underpinning that is evi-
denced throughout capitalist society." Nicole Hahn Rafter & Elena M. Natalizia, Marxist
Feminism: Implications for Criminal Justice, in THm CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN
465, 465 (Barbara R. Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., 1982).
38. Id.
39. See generally Susan S. Edwards, A Socio-legal Evaluation of Gender Ideologies in Do-
mestic Violence Assault and Spousal Homicides, 10 VICrMOLOGY: INT'L 3. 186, 186 (1985).
See also Thomas & Beasley, supra note 3, at 60 (domestic violence is leveled at women be-
cause they are women in order to inhibit them from realizing their rights and as a means of
maintaining their subordinate status).
40. R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIvES: A CASE
AGAINST Tim PATRIARCHY 23 (1979). "In the workplace, in the home, on the street, men
have significant power over women. This imbalance of power not only allows individual men
to control individual women, it perpetuates itself in conditioning each subsequent generation
of women and men to take their places in the predefined order." Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun
is Always Pointed. Sexual Violence and Title 11 Of The Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO.
L.J 2197, 2206-07 (1992).
41. Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societa4 Judicial and Legislative
Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 983, 983 (1989).
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patriarchs created: law, language,42 religion, and marriage.4" Such an ex-
amination reveals that in domestic relations the common bond was that
women were the chattel of men. Thus, society's traditional view of a
woman's "proper" role was built upon the systematic domination and
subordination of women."
A. Early Western Civilization
The history of women's subordination dates back to the early Greeks
and Romans and the nomadic period of the ancient Hebrews." In these
societies women were controlled by men." A woman's value was con-
nected to her sexuality and fertility.4 7 Indicative of this value was a He-
brew husband's power to sentence his wife to death for adultery.48 In
early Roman society, women were classified as property.49 Under Ro-
man law, a man could beat, divorce, or murder his wife for offenses she
committed that disparaged his honor or threatened his property rights.5
Enforcement of these rights of control was considered a private matter.5'
Even though in later Roman society some women entered the polit-
ical, intellectual, and religious arenas, men retained their authority and
control over their wives and daughters by, among other things, shaping
the law. 2 For example, a woman in the upper class had valid grounds
for divorce only if her husband used unjustifiable and excessive
violence.53
42. "Language is socially constructed and [is] a facile manipulator of our understanding
rather than a neutral descriptive tool." Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Wo-
men, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 252
n.254 (1992) (quoting Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 16 n.14 (1988)). In a society built upon bias towards men, biases inevitably
exist in language that is man-made. Michelle Bograd, Family Systems Approaches to Wife
Battering: A Feminist Critique, AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 558, 562 (1984).
43. "The victimization of one subjected to domestic violence or spousal homicide does not
begin sequentially at the point of being battered, instead the victimology applied to that vic-
tim, shared in language, background expectancies, explanations, and understandings, exists
already before the violence has been committed." Edwards, supra note 39, at 186.
44. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 33.
45. Salina Szechtman, Wife Abuse: Women's Duties - Men's Rights, 10 VIcrmoLoGY:
INT'L J. 253, 254 (1985).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 34-36 (examining male domination of wo-
men in Roman society).
50. See id. at 36-37 (a wife's consumption of wine or adultery could result in punishment).
51. See id. at 38 (chastisement regarded as a domestic affair).
52. Id. at 38-40.
53. Id. at 38-39.
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1. Early Christian Attitudes
The Old and New Testaments espouse and instruct the subservience
of women.54 The creation of Eve from the rib of Adam provided fertile
ground for sermons proclaiming women's submissive role within the
family.5 5 A virtuous woman was docile, chaste, and passive 6.5  A wife
who failed to meet these standards was subject to death by mutilation or
stoning.5 7 In addition, conduct acceptable for men was denounced when
committed by a woman.58 According to Biblical law, rape was consid-
ered an encroachment of the father's or husband's property interest
rather than a crime against the woman. 9
Through the twelfth century, the church's position toward women re-
mained basically unchanged.6 0 A medieval publication of canon law, re-
lying on Roman law, argued that as the subjects of men, women should
be deprived of all authority.61
A husband's right of chastisement, later sanctioned by Blackstone,62
can be traced to the late 1400s in Father Cherubino's Rules of Mar-
riage.3 The Rules ordained that "when a wife committed an offense
against her husband, he should '[s]cold her sharply, bully and terrify her.
And if this still doesn't work... take up a stick and beat her soundly
... . "' 4 The endorsement of the Rules of Marriage by the Catholic
Church furthered the institutional and societal subordination and degra-
54. See Sewell, supra note 41 at 986 (1989) (citing e.g., 1 Corinthians 11:3 (a man is to
woman as Christ is to man); Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (a man who rapes a virgin shall pay her
father compensation and marry her); Genesis 3:16 (Eve's temptation of Adam renders man
woman's master).
55. Sewell, supra note 41, at 986; see also Genesis 2:22.
56. Sewell, supra note 41, at 986.
57. See id.; see also Deuteronomy 25:11-12 (punishment for a wife who touched a man not
her husband should be mutilation); Deuteronomy 22:13-21 (an unmarried woman not a virgin
was stoned to death); ANsoN SHUPE r AL., VIOLENT MEN, VIOLENT COUPLES 87-89 (1987)
(addressing violence against women in the Bible).
58. See generally Richard Lewis Tannen, Setting the Agenda for the 1990s: The Historical
Foundations of Gender Bias in the Law: A Context for Reconstruction, 42 FLA. L. REv. 163,
174 (1990) (citing Genesis 38:24 (daughter-in-law who conceived a child out of wedlock was
sentenced to death by burning by her father-in-law); Genesis 16:3-4 (Abraham impregnates
his wife's maid)).
59. Id. at 175; see also Deuteronomy 22:28-29.
60. See Sewell, supra note 41, at 986; see also DOASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 40
(according to Christian tenets, women were inferior).
61. Sewell, supra note 41, at 986; see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 40.
62. 1 WILLIAM BLAcxsroNE, COMMENTARIEs *444.
63. McConnell, supra note 42, at 232 n.144.
64. Id,
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dation of women.65 Thereafter, laws throughout Europe classified wo-
men as the property of their husbands or fathers.66
2. English Common Law
During the feudal period from the ninth to the fifteenth century, in-
heritance and the protection of property were of paramount impor-
tance.67 Because women were the bearers of children and viewed as
unable to defend the land, they were excluded from land ownership.6"
According to the feudal doctrine of coverture, inasmuch as a wife was
under the protection or "cover" of her husband, her legal identity was
lost upon marriage.69 Status and political power were acquired through
the ownership of land.70 Since women were denied both, they inescap-
ably were inferior citizens.7'
The unities theory, a derivative of the feudal doctrine of coverture,
advanced the subjugation and subordination of women even further.72
This theory, articulated by Sir William Blackstone, held that "[b]y mar-
riage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated [into her husband]. 73 Although
the doctrine held that husband and wife became one upon marriage, in
actuality "the one [was] the husband." 74 A wife could not enter into a
contract, sue or be sued, own personal property, make a will, or deny her
husband's sexual advances.75 "The unities doctrine thus served to legiti-
mate the propertization of women through marriage. '76 The rationale
for the doctrine was that it supported the marital relationship and family
harmony.77
Blackstone further decreed that a husband was allowed to beat his
wife. The basis for this right of chastisement lay in the doctrine of cover-
65. SeweIl, supra note 41, at 986.
66. See McConnell, supra note 42, at 232 n.144.
67. Szechtman, supra note 45, at 254.
68. Id.
69. Sue E. Eisenberg & Patricia L. Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 138, 145 (1977-1978).
70. Szechtman, supra note 45, at 254.
71. Id.
72. Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1256 (1986) [hereinafter To Have & To Hold].
73. Id; United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
74. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
75. See also To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1256; Finesmith, supra note 15, at 80.
76. To Have and To Hold, supra note 72, at 1256.
77. Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 69, at 146; Finesmith, supra note 15, at 80.
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ture, which imputed a wife's misbehavior to her husband.78 Chastise-
ment was also justified as a means of maintaining family discipline and
order.79
Social practice, in actuality, encouraged rape both within and prior to
marriage.80 "The English customs of 'bride capture,' whereby a man
staked his claim to a woman through rape, and 'stealing an heiress,'
whereby a man kidnapped a woman into marriage, were ways for men to
acquire valuable property and social status."81 Rape laws, therefore, de-
veloped to protect the property interests men had in their women, not to
protect women themselves.82 The chattel theory held that women were
first the chattel of their fathers and upon marriage became the chattel of
their husbands.8 3 Since his daughter's virginity was a valuable commod-
ity, and the father had an interest in succession rights to propertied land,
rape of an unmarried woman was considered theft of the father's prop-
erty.r4 Rape of a married woman was theft of a husband's right to pos-
session in his property.8 Therefore, under the chattel theory,
"prosecuting a husband for raping his wife made no more sense than
indicting him for stealing his own property.8s6 When a husband raped
his wife he was merely using his property.87
Another rationale for the marital rape exemption originated in the
seventeenth century with the declaration of Lord Matthew Hale: "the
husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself on his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot re-
tract. '8 8 Although Hale cited no legal authority for this proposition,8 9
the contract theory of "implied consent" has been the most commonly
78. 1 BLAcscrrTON, supra note 62, at *444.
79. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 60; RuLE OF THUMB, supra note 16, at 2.
80. To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1257.
81. Id.; see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAiNST OUR WHIL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 7,
15 (1975).
82. Sandra L. Ryder & Sheryl A. Kuzmenka, Legal Rape: The Marital Rape Exemption,
24 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 393, 394 (1991).
83. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 36-37 (discussing women as chattel of their fathers and
upon marriage as chattel of their husbands).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 394 (1991); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 37.
87. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306, 309 (1977) [hereinafter
Marital Rape Exemption].
88. 1 MATHEW HALE, THE HIsrORY OF THE PLEAs OF THE CRowN 629 (S. Emlyn ed.,
1778). See also Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 87, at 307 (United States' judicial recogni-
tion of the marital rape exemption was based on Hale's theory).
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invoked justification for the marital rape exemption.9° The law on mari-
tal rape clearly established a man's sexual entitlement to his wife. The
exemption reinforced social practice, sanctioning female sexual subordi-
nation as a weapon in man's struggle for power: "Men's acquisition of
women as property was thus regulated by laws on rape."91
With the advent of industrialization, the feudal system broke down.92
Subsistence came from wage labor performed outside the house, in the
public sphere.93 Although some women were allowed to work outside
the home, they were forced to give their wages to their husbands.94 Hus-
bands, in turn, were charged with the obligation to support their wives.95
The law, however, offered no protection for wives if this support was not
provided:
Thus, with the aid of women's labor, men were able to accumu-
late capital; this, in turn, increased the latter's political power. As
men gained more political power and capital, the division of labor
between productive (meaning wage labor) and reproductive
work, came to be accepted. However, reproductive labor (that is,
childcare and maintenance, as well as housework) was not recog-
nized as contributing to the generation of wealth or to a society's
growth.96
Hence, man's pursuit of his proper role increased his status and power,
while a woman fulfilling her proper role increased her subjugation and
subservience. This concept of public versus private foreshadowed the
separate spheres theory, which today is used to justify the unequal treat-
ment of women.9 7
While the post-feudal period brought changes to society's political,
economic, and religious institutions, these changes continued to foster
89. State v. Smith, 372 A.2d 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 404
A.2d 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1981); Ryder &
Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 395.
90. See To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1256. Hale also intimated that women
could easily fabricate rape charges, a concern that has evolved into the "cry-rape" syndrome
(if marital rape is illegal then wives will fabricate charges against their husbands), a modem
rationale for the exemption. See Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 395; see also Marital
Rape Exemption, supra note 87, at 314-15.
91. To Have and to Hold, supra note 72, at 1257.
92. Szechtman, supra note 45, at 254.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 254-55.
97. See infra part II.B.2.
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male domination within the family.98 However, the type and extent of
physical punishment a husband could inflict upon his wife was re-
stricted.99 A husband too harsh in his punishment could be ridiculed by
his neighbors. 00 Nevertheless, such disapproval was mild in contrast to
societal condemnation of disobedient wives.10'
B. Early American Response To Domestic Violence
1. Colonial Period
Believing family violence was a threat to the settlement's orderliness
and stability, the Puritans disavowed its use.'0 2 In the mid-1600's, Mas-
sachusetts Bay' 03 and Plymouth Bayl°4 colonies enacted laws proscribing
wife abuse.'05 These laws, however, were not rigorously enforced. 06
Despite charges of abuse, Colonial courts preferred to reconcile
couples.'0 7 Puritans excused a husband's assault if he could justify the
beating.'0 8 Any disapproval of domestic violence was weakened by the
pressure placed on Colonial courts to follow English jurisprudence. 0 9
In reality, a man's/husband's position of power and authority was
never really jeopardized. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence pro-
claims: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
98. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 48 (addressing economic, political, and
religious institutional changes in the modem era).
99. See id. at 56 (discussing societal limitations on a husband's right of chastisement).
100. See id. at 58 (an excessively abusive husband was subject to public disgrace).
101. Sewell, supra note 41, at 987. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 59 (women
accused of infidelity were subject to public whipping or dunking).
102. See generally ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESnc TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
SoCIAL. PoLIcY AGANsr FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TnvMs To THE PRESENT 17
(1987) (addressing domestic violence in puritan settlements). Family violence was considered
sinful; however, women who didn't behave properly were often charged with witchcraft. Id. at
19.
103. See GEORGE A. ERNsT, Tnm LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN IN MAssACHUsETrS 66
(1897) (The Body of Liberties, passed in Massachusetts Bay in 1641, forbade wife abuse unless
it was in self-defense).
104. See JOHN A. GOODwrN, THE PIGrmM REPuBLc 597 n.1 (1920) (law enacted in
Plymouth Bay in 1671 punished wife abuse with fines or corporal punishment).
105. See PLEcK, supra note 102, at 21 (examining the first domestic abuse laws). See also
Sewell, supra note 41, at 988-89.
106. See id. at 25 (regardless of the laws and abusive behavior, Puritans honored a hus-
band's role as head of the household).
107. See id. at 23 (a Puritan court offered little protection for an abused wife at the ex-
pense of separating the family).
108. Id. at 24-25. See also Sewell, supra note 41, at 989 n.53 and accompanying text.
109. See PLEcK, supra note 102, at 19. See also Sewell, supra note 41, at 989.
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unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness." 110 Neither the Declaration of Independence nor the United
States Constitution were intended to include humankind,"' rather they
proclaim the rights of man and embalm his entitlements. 12 Our Found-
ing Fathers explicitly denied "full personhood" to women." 3
2. Nineteenth Century America
As long as it did not conflict with the Constitution or state statutes,
the new states generally incorporated the British common law as it ex-
isted after the Revolutionary War." 4 As a result, Blackstone's Commen-
taries and English law had a significant impact on the American legal
system. 1 5 For example, in 1824 the Supreme Court of Mississippi af-
firmed English common law by stating that a husband had the right to
chastise his wife. 1 6 The court also stated that in exercising this right, a
husband should not be subjected to "vexatious prosecutions" by his wife,
and that courts should be hesitant to expose such private conduct to pub-
lic scrutiny." 7
The first American court to recognize the spousal rape exemption
was a Massachusetts court in 1857. In Commonwealth v. Fogerty,"8 the
court, relying solely on Hale's unsupported declaration, stated in dictum
that marriage to the victim was a defense to rape."9 It is possible, how-
ever, that judicial affirmation occurred even earlier. 20 According to
110. THm DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
111. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Women, Men, and the Supreme Court Rulings, in WOMEN IN
THE COURTS 22 (Winifred L. Hepperle & Laura Crites eds., 1978) (with regard to women,
Thomas Jefferson said: "Were our state a pure democracy there would still be excluded from
our deliberations women, who, to prevent deprivation of morals and ambiguity of issues,
should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of men." Id. (quoted in MARTIN GRUBERG, WO-
MEN IN AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (1968)).
112. Cf George Kriegman, Entitlement Attitudes: Psychological and Therapeutic Implica-
tions, in AnrrruDEs OF ENTITLEMENT 1 (1988).
113. "To the extent that the Framers' intent can fairly be fathomed, the dominant concep-
tions denied the humanity and equality of a majority of the American people, including wo-
men, the Native American population and people of color." Sylvia L. Law, Family, Gender &
Sexuality, 26 JUDGES' J., Summer 1987, at 22, 56. Despite this fact, there are many who sub-
scribe to the notion that we should "look to the original intent of the men who drafted and
ratified the Constitution to determine its contemporary meaning." Id. at 23.
114. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 397.
115. Sewell, supra note 41, at 988.
116. Bradley v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824).
117. Id. at 158.
118. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 491 (1857).
119. Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 562
(1990-91).
120. See Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 396 n.32 and accompanying text.
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most statutes and common law interpretation, an element of rape was
that the victim was not the spouse of the rapist.121 Therefore, few cases
have dealt with the issue directly."z
The early decades of the nineteenth century confirm strong judicial
approval of men's rights and privileges. 23 In 1836, a New Hampshire
court held that a wife who failed to submit to the legitimate authority of
her husband could not obtain a divorce.'24 Any woman who provoked
her husband's anger or refused to remain silent deserved any abuse in-
flicted upon her.'25 Consequently, she had no right to complain. 26 The
husband was regarded as the head of the household. 27  Since his wife
was subordinate to him, he had the right to control her actions.' 28
Although society denounced a husband who beat his wife, a worse of-
fense was the wife's rebellion against the proper exercise of her hus-
band's authority. 29 Courts stressed the importance of family autonomy
and privacy by their reluctance to intrude into the domestic sphere.130
The last half of the nineteenth century brought changes to women's
legal status when virtually every state passed Married Women's Property
Acts.' 31 Among other things, the Acts allowed women to enter into con-
tracts, sue or be sued, manage their own property, and work outside the
home without requiring their husbands' permission. 32 Although alter-
ing the status of women in the legal and economic spheres, women con-
tinued to be under the domination and control of men. In these Acts lay
the groundwork for the succeeding theory upon which women were de-
nied equality and autonomy. 33
121. Id. at 396-97 nn33-34 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
123. See Sewell, supra note 41, at 990.
124. Poor v. Poor, 8 N.H. 307, 316 (1836). See Sewell, supra note 41, at 990.
125. Poor, 8 N.H. at 310-16. See also Sewell, supra note 41, at 990-91 nn.60-64.
126. Poor, 8 N.H. at 310-16.
127. Id. at 314-15 (the husband was the head of house, the wife was subordinate to him).
128. See id. at 314-15 (the rationale lay in the husband's responsibility for his wife's torts,
debts and crimes committed in his presence).
129. Id. at 313 (a wife's rebellious conduct was worse than a husband's actions). The
court placed the responsibility for preventing further abuse on the wife. Id. at 319-20.
130. See Adams v. Adams, 100 Mass. 365, 373 (1868) (refusal to issue writ of supplicavit
against an abusive husband); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 454-59 (1868)(court
interference was a greater outrage than domestic abuse; state government was subordinate to
the family government, which men were charged with ruling).
131. See LEO KANowrrz, WOMAN AND THm LAW: THE UNIMnsmED REVOLuriON 40-41
(1969).
132. Id. See also To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1257 n.16.
133. Id. at 1257.
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The Acts gave full effect to the "separate spheres" ideology. This
doctrine gradually superseded the unities theory as the legal justification
for the marital rape exemption and non-intervention by the state.134
This theory holds that men occupy the public realms of politics and the
marketplace while women occupy the private realm of the family. 13
5
Women were no longer inferior, they were simply "different.' 36 The
separate spheres ideology served as the catalyst for the view, still widely
accepted, that "any legal intrusion upon the woman's sphere constituted
an illegitimate public invasion of the private sphere.' 37 Thus, the subor-
dination of women was accomplished through the absence of laws re-
straining male power 138 and the deliberateness with which a blind eye
was turned from the home, whether it be violent or not.139
Some states, however, began to reject the notion of a husband's right
to chastise his wife through judicial decisions, 40 through the enactment
of statutes punishing abusers,' 4 ' or by permitting divorce on grounds of
cruelty.142 One court held that although the right of chastisement was
"abolished," the state should continue to refrain from interfering. 14 3 In
reality, however, legal relief was accessible only to those women who
could afford the cost of litigation, and then only if they could endure the
134. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 177-78 (1982).
135. As one Supreme Court Justice wrote, "the civil law, as well as nature herself, has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and wo-
man." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
136. See To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1257; see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 958 (1984) ("Assumptions about biological
difference and destiny provided the prime justification for creating a separate, inferior legal
status for women." (footnotes omitted)).
137. To Have and to Hold, supra note 72, at 1258. See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 117, 122 (David Kairys ed., 1982) ("Isolating women in a sphere divorced from the legal
order contributes directly to their inferior status by denying them ... legal relief ... and by
sanctioning conduct of the men who control their lives.").
138. See To Have and to Hold, supra note 72, at 1258.
139. "The court likened the family to a government within itself, subordinate to state law
yet free from interference absent infliction of intolerable abuse or permanent injury." See
Sewell, supra note 41, at 992 n.71; see also State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 456-57
(1868).
140. Alabama and Massachusetts judicially abrogated a husband's right to physically
abuse his wife. See Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871); Commonwealth v McAfee, 108 Mass.
458 (1871).
141. See PLECK, supra note 102, at 109 (Maryland, Delaware, and Oregon passed legisla-
tion allowing punishment for abusive husbands).
142. See DOASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 64.
143. See Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 459 (husbands' abuse rights abolished, but reiterated that
courts should be disinclined to inquire into domestic affairs).
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resulting humiliation and social criticism.?" In at least one state the hus-
band's right of chastisement was still honored, 45 while in every state it
remained legal for a husband to rape his wife.
a) The Thirteenth Amendment
The intent of the Thirteenth Amendment 146 was to abolish the sys-
tem of chattel slavery, whereby white people legally owned African-
Americans as their personal property. 147 Some members of Congress
recognized the parallels between the master-slave relationship and the
husband-wife relationship."48 Concern was expressed "that the Thir-
teenth Amendment had the potential to reach into the private sphere of
the home and to alter the traditional relationship between husband and
wife.' 1 49 During debates on drafts of proposed amendments, one Sena-
tor stated that if the Amendment were enacted "a woman would be
equal to a man [and a] wife would be equal to her husband as free...
before the ... law."' 5° "Congress ... chose to limit the scope of the
Amendment, no doubt fearing the slippery slope of a constitutional
amendment with the breadth to touch the most sacred of... institutions,
the relationship between man and woman in marriage."'' In fact, early
cases interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment indicate Congress only in-
tended to alter the relationship of master and slave. 52 The limitation
placed on the Amendment through the selection of its language and the
144. Finesmith, supra note 15, at 80.
145. See Knight v. Knight, 31 Iowa 451, 457-58 (1871) (the wife/victim of domestic abuse
was denied a divorce because she invited the abuse by her insubordinate behavior).
146. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIII, § 1, provides in pertinent part "[n]either slavery nor invol-
untary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
147. McConnell, supra note 42, at 211-12.
148. Id. at 207 n.2. "A husband has a right of property in the service of his wife; he has
the right to the management of his household affairs.... All these rights rest upon the same
basis as a man's right of property in the services of slaves." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
215 (1865) (statement of Rep. White).
149. McConnell, supra note 42, at 215-16 (citing Amy Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage
Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. aisr. 471, 477 (1988)).
150. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of Sen. Howard).
151. McConnell, supra note 42, at 217.
152. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275,282 (1897) (dictum). See McConnell, supra note
42, at 216-17 (due to its unique common law status, it is reasonable to conclude that the
husband-wife relationship, like the parent-child relationship, was considered protected from
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition).
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debates surrounding its enactment illustrate a continued commitment to
the subservience of women.153
C. Twentieth Century America
Notwithstanding the statutory and judicial reforms of the late nine-
teenth century and the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,'" do-
mestic violence was not an important issue.' 55 Traditional doctrine
concerning the family and proper gender roles was reiterated. 56 Early
twentieth century family court systems advocated family preservation 57
and discouraged separation and divorce, often boasting of their record of
reconciling couples. 5 8 Rather than meting out criminal punishment for
an abusive husband, the courts might appoint case workers to investigate
the home, mediate between the spouses, or perhaps offer the wife advice
on how to please her husband so she could avoid physical abuse.' 5 9
Wives would be urged to withdraw complaints, be denied petitions for
financial support from their husbands, or courts would assign their cases
to social service organizations. 60
The spousal immunity doctrine, which prevented battered wives from
bringing tort actions against their abusive husbands, appeared in the
early 1900S.161 "Then, as now, the doctrine was justified [as a means] of
supporting the marital relationship and domestic harmony."'162 Thus, the
reality was that criminal courts, family courts, and civil courts offered
virtually no assistance or protection to abused women.
During the first sixty years of the twentieth century, existing domes-
tic violence legislation was largely ignored or circumvented by the courts
and law enforcement agencies. 63 This allowed men, as individuals and
153. McConnell, supra note 42, at 215-17. Moreover, because women were denied the
right to vote they had no political power. The result for women was inferiority within the
private sphere and something less than non-existence within the public sphere.
154. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. Const. amend XIX.
155. See Sewell, supra note 41, at 994; see also SHI-PE ET AL., supra note 57, at 12.
156. See PLECK, supra note 102, at 126.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 125, 138-39 (preservation of the family was the goal; court procedures were
established to discourage separation and divorce).
159. Id. at 140-41 (judges referred wives to social service agencies, or would counsel the
wife on how to satisfy her husband).
160. Id.
161. Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 69, at 146; Finesmith, supra note 15, at 80.
162. Finesmith, supra note 15, at 80.
163. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 64.
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as a class, to maintain and strengthen their dominant position over
women.
Psychoanalysts of that period had a tremendous impact on the per-
ception of domestic violence."6 Domestic violence was attributed to the
victim's inherent sexual and biological functions. 165 The theory that
masochism played a significant role in women's lives emerged. 66 Mas-
ochism allegedly caused women to provoke their husbands to batter
them and then to remain in the abusive relationship. 167 Both practicing
psychiatrists and the general public were persuaded to shift the blame
away from the man-abuser and onto the woman-victim. 68
The women's movement of the 1960s is widely credited with the "dis-
covery" of wife abuse.1 69 By 1978 there were only nine states that had
legislation addressing the issue of domestic violence.170 Some states had
begun to make provisions for battered women's shelters. 71 Still, most
batterers were not prosecuted, and until the 1970s there was no mean-
ingful attempt to enforce existing criminal laws. 72 Early studies re-
vealed the casual response of the criminal justice system as a whole to
the issue of domestic violence and the battered woman. 73 Some re-
searchers interpreted these findings as evidence that the chattel theory
persisted in the minds of judges and attorneys.1 74
In the late 1970s the validity of the marital rape exemption was ques-
tioned.175 The anti-rape movement asserted that the myths about the
nature of male and female sexuality and beliefs about the "proper" roles
of women punished rape victims by defining rapes as "victim-precipi-
tated crimes. 17 6 The battered women's movement viewed domestic vio-
164. See PLEcK, supra note 102, at 145-46 (disciples of Freud had influence on the percep-
tion of wife abuse).
165. Id. at 125. A New York court psychiatrist testified that when the husband got drunk,
spent his salary, and then beat his wife, the source of the problem lay in the menopausal wife
who was "upset and undemonstrative toward her husband." Id.
166. Id. at 158-59.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 160-63.
169. "Like sexual harassment, the 'problem' of battering and the social and legal con-
struct of a 'battered woman' did not exist in this country until the women's movement named
it." Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CoNN. L. Rav. 973, 979-80 (1991).
170. Fmesmith, supra note 15, at 80.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 80 (citing DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 8).
173. Norma J. Wikler, Water on Stone: A Perspective on the Movement to Eliminate Gen-
der Bias in the Courts, ST. Cr. J., Summer 1989, at 13, 14.
174. Id.
175. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 398.
176. See Wider, supra note 173, at 6.
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lence as a manifestation of the male power and female subordination
inherent in gender relations. 77 Although there had been "little change
in the culture of female subordination that supported and maintained
abuse," women began to take on "new roles." 178 In the late 1960s, pio-
neer female litigators began to observe for themselves how judges with
stereotypical, gender-biased attitudes could undermine legal reform
through the exercise of judicial discretion and through their courtroom
behavior. 79
Feminists proposed that male-female relationships were formed by
the unequal allocation of power based on gender. 80 "As the dominant
class, men have differential access to important material and symbolic
resources, while women are devalued as secondary and inferior. Vio-
lence (such as rape or battering) is the most overt and visible form of
control wielded by men as a class over women."' 8' Thus, domestic vio-
lence was characterized as an aspect of gender relations and a reflection
of male power and female subordination. Viewed in this light, domestic
abuse becomes a kind of gender terrorism.'8
III. DOMESTIC ABUSE TODAY: RESPONSES AND RATIONALES
The legal and social status of women has changed over the past one
hundred years. 83 The contemporary treatment of marital rape and do-
mestic violence, however, demonstrates an underlying commitment to
female subordination and female difference. 184 "Although legislators
and judges do not explicitly refer to women as chattel or to women's
natural role in the home,18 5 the rationales for the marital rape exemption
.. betray deep, perhaps unconscious, discriminatory views."' 86 Adher-
177. Schneider, supra note 169, at 980.
178. Id. at 983.
179. Wikler, supra note 173, at 6.
180. Bograd, supra note 42, at 558-9.
181. Id.
182. Edward W. Gondolf, Anger and Oppression in Men Who Batter: Empiricist and Fem-
inist Perspectives and their Implications for Research, 10 VIcrIMOLOGY: INT'L J. 311, 313
(1985).
183. To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1258.
184. Id.
185. See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980). "Nowhere... is a woman
regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associ-
ated with recognition as a whole human being." Id. Unfortunately, merely saying it doesn't
make it so.
186. To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1258.
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ence to these concepts necessarily serves to maintain male power in male
dominated institutions. 87
A. The Parties
1. The Abuser
Before turning to the criminal justice system's response to domestic
abuse, it is helpful to explore the justifications men give for assault, bat-
tery, and rape. One of the erroneous beliefs about domestic violence is
that it is a problem only among the poor and minorities.188 This miscon-
ception can be explained in part by the fact that battered women who
are poor lack the resources of their middle- and upper-class counter-
parts; therefore, they are more likely to come to the attention of govern-
mental officials. 89 The reality is that men who batter, stalk, and rape, as
well as their victims, come from all social, economic, and ethnic
groups.190
There is no single profile of the typical batterer.191 However, batter-
ers generally embrace traditional gender roles more strongly. 92 They
believe the man is "the master" of the house; 93 that men have the right
to a woman's services, including sex,194 with the corresponding right to
obtain these services through violence. 95 "Sex is frequently the most
significant service in the battering relationship; it becomes symbolic of
the man's total domination of the woman."' 9 6
187. "Men are able to rape because of their power-privileged position in society." Willis,
supra note 40, at 2208.
188. Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding
the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 276 (1985).
189. Id.
190. Guy, supra note 7, at 995 n.33 (discussing stalkers and batterers); Waits, supra note
188, at 276 (discussing spousal abuse); Augustine, supra note 119, at 560 (citing statistic of one
study which found that one of seven married women has been raped by her husband).
191. See DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIvEs 45 (1976).
192. McConnell, supra note 42, at 231.
193. Waits, supra note 188, at 286. "The individual batterer abuses his wife not so much
to release his anger ... but rather, for the same reason men exploit women in the larger
society and have beaten and discriminated against them throughout history-to keep them in
their place." Gondolf, supra note 182, at 316.
194. See DAVID FINKELHOR & KERsTN YLLO, LICENSE To RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF
WrvEs 6-7, 61-83 (1985) (one out of ten wives had been sexually assaulted by her husband at
least once; the husband-rapists interviewed claimed they had a right to forcible sexual rela-
tions); DIANA E. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 61 (1990) (one out of every three battered
women had been raped by her batterer).
195. McConnell, supra note 42, at 231.
196. Id.
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Abusers also believe a man has a right to discipline his wife. 1" Vio-
lence is triggered when the batterer believes that the woman has failed
to serve him in the way he deserves and desires.198 Batterers provide
elaborate justifications for their abuse:199 "They use minimization, in-
tentionality, confusion, outright denial, intoxication, loss of control, and
projection of blame to deny any responsibility. Similarly, interviews with
men who rape show that they use almost identical justifications to excuse
their violent acts. '"200
The abuser needs to dominate and control his wife or girlfriend.20'
He alone is entitled to possession of her.2° One method of control that
batterers use is limiting the woman's access to others by isolating her.2"3
To that end, he may prevent her from getting medical treatment or pro-
hibit her from seeing family members.2°4 Attempts at domination may
take the form of controlling access to food or money or threatening their
children with abuse.20 5 Some abusive men torment their victims with the
potential loss of their children through custody battles or parental kid-
napping.20 6 The result of these "coercive techniques is to [fortify] the
ultimate power of the man over the woman. '20 7
Like batterers, many intimate stalkers regard their victims as their
personal possessions.208 If the woman expresses a desire for indepen-
dence, the abuser views this as a threat to his dominance. Consequently,
he applies force or threats of force in order to maintain his and her rela-
tive positions within the relationship.20 9 Termination of the relationship
is the ultimate threat to the abuser's dominance and often increases the
risk of aggression and stalking:210 "When persons perceive that they are
being threatened [or] have become powerless.., they assert themselves
197. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WoMAN 12 (1979).
198. Id.
199. Gondolf, supra note 182, at 320.
200. Id.
201. Waits, supra note 188, at 286-87.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 191, at 84.
204. McConnell, supra note 42, at 233.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id
208. McAnaney, supra note 8, at 841.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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through the most expedient means available - violence."2"' Thus, vio-
lence supports a perception of power.212
The fact that many battered women cannot escape their abusive situ-
ations also promotes the batterer's belief in his right to coerce his vic-
tiM.213 Many cases of rape and violence occur after the parties no longer
live together.21 4 The prevalence of violations of temporary restraining
orders is indicative of abusers' belief in their right to dominate and
posses their women. 5
2. The Victim
The traditional psychiatric evaluation of a woman who remains in, or
leaves and returns to, an abusive relationship is that she is a masochist,
staying in the abusive relationship because she enjoys being beaten.216
Society's predisposition is to blame the victim,217 believing that but for
her action or inaction the assault would not have occurred.218 The vic-
tim, in fact, often blames herself for the violence.219 A battered woman
accepts what traditionally have been promoted as proper male and fe-
male roles.22 In her mind her success is predicated on her role as wife
and mother.221 The happiness of the family rests with her.22 2 Therefore,
she believes any family conflict, including violence, is her fault.'
211. Gondolf, supra note 182, at 320.
212. Id.
Violence may be used by individual men to control or punish individual women who
challenge, or are seen to be challenging, their authority. Even if men do not express
their power in this way, the fact that they can if they so choose inevitably underlies
apparently harmonious interactions between those who are not equal. In this way the
power of men, as individuals and as a sex class, can be asserted.
Jalna Hanmer, Policing Men's Violence: An Introduction, in WOMEN POLICING AND MALE
VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERsPEcrrvEs 4 (Jalna Hanmer et al. eds., 1989).
213. McConnell, supra note 42, at 233.
214. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y.
1984); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987).
215. McConnell, supra note 42, at 233.
216. See MARTIN, supra note 191, at 67-71 (discussing the myth of battered women as
masochists); WALxER, supra note 197, at 20.
217. See WALxER, supra note 197, at 31 (discussing that the victims believe the myths).
218. See Edwards, supra note 39, at 189-90. "Women who are victims of sexual assault,
sexual harassment and domestic violence are always in retrospect perceived as having taken
some risk, contributed to the assault, or provoked their attacker." Id.
219. See Waits, supra note 188, at 281 n.66 (victims blame themselves for the violence).
220. See WALKER, supra note 197, at 33 (battered women usually come from homes in
which traditional sex roles have been emphasized).
221. Id. at 23.
222. Id. at 34.
223. Id. at 33.
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"Some wives do not perceive forcible intercourse by their husbands as a
criminal act; instead, they simply accept their submissive position in the
relationship." 4 The lack of criminalization of spousal rape encourages
this view as there is a tendency for people to identify conduct as immoral
only if it is defined as criminal .2 5
Another factor affecting victims of domestic violence is the lack of
social or legal resources.2 6 When police refuse to treat domestic vio-
lence as a crime, women are likely to see police as supporting their hus-
band or boyfriend, causing them to feel frustrated, defenseless, and
alone.227 The view that domestic abuse is a minor problem that is best
dealt with at home is also influential.2 8 This attitude is often manifested
in the criminal justice system and society at large." 9
Learned helplessness often results from continued violence or threats
of violence. Although a victim may take responsibility for her abuser's
behavior, she is unable to initiate behavior that might provide relief,
such as leaving the relationship.2 30 A by-product of the abuse is that she
becomes unable to perceive possible solutions to her problem.2 31 Fur-
thermore, in many abusive situations the woman is financially dependent
upon her abuser. Even if she works outside the home, the abuser fre-
quently demands that she give her wages to him.232 She may feel emo-
224. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 410-11. "The reason why women 'take' such
abuse, from ogling on the street to so-called date rapes, has to do with the gender domination
that pervades their every moment of existence. The violent episodes are not a sharp break
from everyday experience, but one extreme." Dorie Klein, Violence Against Women: Some
Considerations Regarding Its Causes and Its Elimination, in THE CRIMINAL JuSTICE SYSTEM
AND WOMEN 203, 210 (Barbara R. Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., 1982).
225. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 51 (concepts of right and wrong have moral roots,
one being criminal law itself).
226. Finesmith, supra note 15, at 82. There is also the problem of under-funding of public
relief agencies for abused women, such as shelters for women and children, counseling serv-
ices, and job-training agencies. Id. "[Wiomen are more likely to suffer abuse when there is
'resource depravation.' They may attempt to escape from the violence or stop it, but their
options are limited or denied. In other words, they are not compliant victims or provocative
accomplices, but trapped by society's lack of response." Gondolf, supra note 182, at 316.
227. Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Con-
stitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L. 788, 790-91 (1986).
228. Finesmith, supra note 15, at 82.
229. Id. "Thus a subtle testimony to the law's success in achieving legitimacy is that wo-
men, and other groups who are oppressed and dominated within society, now largely accept
the law's categories and its modes of discourse." Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and
Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 294, 300 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
230. WALKER, supra note 197, at 48.
231. Id. at 47-48.
232. Id. at 33-34.
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tionally dependent on him as well.3 3 Often times she may lack other
emotional resources, such as friends and family who are willing to sup-
port her decision to leave2 34 Finally, she may be all too aware that end-
ing the relationship does not invariably end the violence.
Women who leave an abusive relationship fear retribution by the
abuser. There is considerable evidence that the woman leaving the rela-
tionship will often precipitate or escalate the violence-3 5 "She may have
tried to leave, only to have him threaten violence against her or others if
she did not return. 2 36 Many men threaten to pursue "their woman"
relentlessly 13 7 The victim may believe that it is pointless to attempt es-
cape.238 She may feel that ultimately the abuser will kill her whether she
leaves or stays?3 9
3. The Criminal Justice System
Before examining the criminal justice system's response to domestic
violence, it is important to note at the outset that the criminal justice
system is not gender-neutral. 24° Studies have concluded that women are
systematically discriminated against in the courts: "[G]ender bias against
women litigants, lawyers and court personnel is a pervasive problem
with grave consequences. Women are often denied equal justice, equal
treatment, and equal opportunity."'241 One committee found that in do-
mestic abuse cases both judges and jurors require more substantiation of
physical injuries than in other serious crimes and that the sentences im-
233. Id. at 68.
234. Finesmith, supra note 15, at 82.
235. See Schafran, supra note 2, at 51 (often the woman faces real danger if she tries to
leave).
236. Waits, supra note 188, at 283.
237. Finesmith, supra note 15, at 82.
238. WALKER, supra note 197, at 75.
239. Id. (discussing women's fears that abusers are capable of killing them).
240. Pamela Jenkins & Barbara Davidson, Battered Women in the Criminal Justice System:
An Analysis of Gender Stereotypes, 8 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 161, 162 (1990). Cf Thomas & Beas-
ley, supra note 3, at 39.
Although international law is gender neutral in theory, in practice it interacts with gen-
der-based domestic laws and social structures that relegate women and men to separate
spheres of existence: private and public. Men exist as public, legal entities in all coun-
tries, and baring an overt abuse by the state, participate in public life and enjoy the full
extent of whatever civil and political rights exist. Women, however, are in every coun-
try socially and economically disadvantaged in practice and in fact in many places by
law. Therefore, their capacity to participate in public life is routinely circumscribed.
Id.
241. Schafran, supra note 2, at 49 (quoting Report of the New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts, 15 FoRDHsm URn. U. 11, 15 (1986-87)).
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posed in these cases are generally lower. The committee also found that
courts are hesitant to impose sanctions on men who violate protective
orders.24 2
Gender bias in the courts places women at a distinct disadvantage.
Coupled with a society and legal system that treats the family as an invi-
olate institution, relief for victims of domestic violence becomes virtually
impossible.243 Because most members of the legal profession are men,
they control how women are treated by the legal system:
Thus, even if the laws were not sexist, the fact that those who
make the laws (federal and state legislators, government adminis-
trators and judges) and those who enforce the laws (police and
courts) are overwhelmingly male, affects in major ways how wo-
men are thought of and treated by the legal system. Even when
the criminal law does not formally discriminate against women, in
practice-as the law operates in the processing of women from po-
lice to courts to jails-the law very often does discriminate. 44
a) The Response of the Legislature
It has been said, "Women, racial/ethnic minorities, the poor, and
working class people rarely benefit from the law .... [R]ich white men
are most influential in creating laws .... Much of criminal law is written
by state legislatures and the United States Congress, whose members are
overwhelmingly male." 245 With respect to domestic violence, history
confirms the veracity of this charge. Traditionally the law has not pro-
vided protection for victims of domestic abuse. Attempts to pass federal
legislation have faced much opposition.246 Objections to the various bills
were made on the grounds that such legislation was an "unacceptable...
intrusion into the domestic realm, an attack on the American family, and
a means of funding feminist causes. '247
242. Id.
243. See Finesmith, supra note 15, at 82.
244. Sokoloff & Price, supra note 36, at 24.
245. Id. at 12. The disproportionately large number of male representatives in state legis-
latures has been cited as a factor contributing to the continued existence of the marital rape
exemption. Augustine, supra note 119, at 584. Iowa State Senator Joseph Coleman stated
that prosecuting a husband for raping his wife "is against natural law." Id. at 589 (citing
Lawmaker: Spousal Rape Violates Natural Order, UPI, Mar. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI file.). A California State Legislator is reported to have said, "If you can't
rape your wife, who can you rape?" Esrmic, supra note 29, at 74.
246. See Sewell, supra note 41, at 998-1000 (discussing the attempts to pass federal legisla-
tion in the 1970's and 1980's).
247. Id. at 999.
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There were other leaders and organizations, however, that provided
support."4 In 1978 and 1982, Congress and the United States Civil
Rights Commission completed studies and produced reports on domestic
violence.249 The 1982 report recognized the problems in many of the
federal programs. 50 These problems included a political and social bias
on the part of those implementing the services, as well as a lack of sym-
pathy and understanding from those who were in a position to help the
victims. 251
In an effort to correct these problems, the Violence Against Women
Act was presented to Congress.5 2 The Act, among other things, creates
federal penalties for the abuser who enters another state to continue
abusing his victim, requires orders of protection to be given "full faith
and credit" by other states, and allows for the expenditure of funds for
shelters and training programs . 3 Although it was first introduced in
1990, the Act was not passed until September 13, 1994.2-5
There is also state legislation addressing domestic abuse. 55 These
laws allow victims to obtain orders of protection if there is evidence of
sexual abuse or actual or threatened physical abuse.256 Some states,
however, mandate that the abuser and victim be related,z 7 whereas
others require that the victim and abuser be members of the same house-
hold.58 In some states separate criminal domestic abuse statutes have
been enacted, which impose a range of penalties from fines to jail
time.5 9 Other states have enacted statutes requiring mandatory arrest
of the abuser if the police have probable cause to believe domestic abuse
has occurred.260
248. See id. at 1000-02 (discussing the support from President Jimmy Carter and the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration).
249. Id. at 1002 n.133 and accompanying text.
250. Id. at 1002 n.134 and accompanying text.
251. See id at 1002.
252. S.11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
253. See Biden, supra note 12, at 59 (discussing the goals and provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act).
254. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
255. See generally Sewell, supra note 41, at 1002-05 (statutes include civil remedies, crimi-
nal remedies, and/or provide public funds for shelters).
256. See id. (discussing the statutes that allow the issuance of restraining orders).
257. Id. at 1003.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 1002-03 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (maxi-
mum sentence of four years and maximum fine of $6,000)).
260. E.g., CoNrN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 770(5) (West Supp. 1993); see also Sarah M. Buel, Note, Mandatory Arrest for Do-
mestic Violence, 11 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 213, 214-15 (1988).
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Some state statutes provide another remedy - allowing the court to
order the abuser into a diversion program.26' This program can act as a
substitute for criminal prosecution or be imposed during the penalty
phase.262 Many battered women's advocates oppose these programs. 263
They believe diversion programs are a milder form of punishment and
the resulting lack of a criminal conviction minimizes the severity of the
violent act.2 4 Furthermore, the use of diversion programs based on the
existence of a relationship between the victim and abuser diminishes the
violent act of the abuser and imputes blame onto the victim. 265 It is also
another example of disparate treatment of violence between strangers
and violence between intimates.
Often a woman leaving an abusive relationship triggers harassment
and violence. This has resulted in the recent legal development of the
crime of stalking. In 1990, California was the first state to enact an anti-
stalking law.266 Since then, the majority of states have followed suit.2 67
There has been much controversy surrounding the stalking laws.268
Some criticism is based on constitutional grounds,269 while others charge
261. See generally Sewell, supra note 41, at 1003. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1000.6(a)(1)-(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (outlining eligibility and extent of diversion pro-
gram); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 769.4a(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
262. Sewell, supra note 41, at 1003 n.148.
263. RULE OF THUmB, supra note 16, at 63.
264. Id. at 62.
265. IL; see also Sewell, supra note 41, at 1003 n.148.
Family counseling is particularly suspect because it tends to displace the responsibility
for the violence and does not address the underlying power differential.... The men
may learn to control their violence, but they may in the process intensify their control
over women in other ways, like withholding finances, manipulating the women ver-
bally, or diminishing their role in decision-making.
Gondolf, supra note 182, at 317.
266. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994). The enactment was triggered in part
by the killing of actress Rebecca Schaeffer by an obsessed fan who had stalked her and the
murder of five women who had been stalked and then killed by former boyfriends or hus-
bands. Each of these five women had obtained a restraining order. Guy, supra note 7, at 991-
92.
267. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048
(West Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West 1994); MiCH. COM. LAWS
ANN. § 750.411h (West Supp. 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-311.02 (1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.32
(West Supp. 1994). See also Guy, supra note 7, at 992 n.7 (partial listing of the states that have
enacted anti-stalking laws).
268. See Guy, supra note 7, at 993.
269. See id. at 993 n.16 and accompanying text (citing Gere-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws
Proliferate, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 35, 36 (stating that stalking laws are void for vagueness)).
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that the statutes are a politically safe short-cut.270 Seeing the need for
such legislation, however, Congress enacted a federal law directing the
National Institute of Justice to draft a model stalking law that would not
violate the Constitution.271 While not a panacea, the enactment of these
statutes is at least a recognition that simply leaving an abuser does not
end the violence. Harassment and stalking do exist; such behavior
should be criminalized and those laws should be fully enforced.
Under common-law definitions of rape, non-consensual sexual inter-
course between husband and wife was excluded.272 The marital rape ex-
emption protects a man who has forcible sexual intercourse with his
wife.273 As previously discussed, the historical justifications for sanction-
ing marital rape were the chattel theory, the unities theory, and the con-
tract theory of implied consent. Courts have since declared that women
are no longer considered the property of men, that women do not sur-
render their identity upon marriage, 274 and that the theory of implied
consent is no longer valid.2 75 Nevertheless, many states continue to rec-
ognize some form of the marital rape exemption,276 while still others
have expanded the exemption to include men who are not married to
their victims. 27 7 "The continued vitality of the exemption demonstrates
270. See id. at 993 (some critics argue the problem is too widespread and complex for one
law to handle; they claim legislators are using these laws as a politically safe shortcut).
271. Id.
272. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 393.
273. Id. at 393-94.
274. Trammel v. United States, 455 U.S. 40 (1980). "Nowhere in the common-law
world-indeed in any modem society-is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial
of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human
being." Id. at 52.
275. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (NJ. 1981).
[Tihis implied consent rationale, besides being offensive to our valued ideals of per-
sonal liberty, is not sound where the marriage itself is not irrevocable. If a wife can
exercise a legal right to separate from her husband and eventually terminate the mar-
riage "contract," may she not also revoke a "term" of that contract, namely, consent to
intercourse? Just as a husband has no right to imprison his wife because of her mar-
riage vow to him ... he has no right to force sexual relations upon her against her will.
Id. at 44. Others have asserted that in marrying, a woman does not agree to a life of sexual
slavery in which she unconditionally surrenders her body to her husband. See Ryder &
Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 402.
276. See generally Augustine, supra note 119, at 578-584 (discussing the status of the ex-
emption under state law). Some jurisdictions have rejected the marital rape exemption, for
example: Alabama (Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986) (abolishing exemp-
tion by judicial action); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (prose-
cutes marital rapists)); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940225(6) (West Supp. 1993).
277. See infra p. 111.
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that legislators view a modicum of family violence as the norm; some
violence by men ought to be expected. 278
Most state statutes no longer explicitly define rape as intercourse
with a female not the spouse of the actor.279 Although today it is less
overt, in many states the marital rape exemption remains firmly intact.
Some states maintain the exemption generally, but deny it upon meeting
certain statutory criteria.280 For example, some states recognize the ex-
emption unless the parties are separated under a court order or unless
they are living separately or one spouse has filed for divorce, annulment,
separation, or separate maintenance. 281 Still other states allow prosecu-
tion if the spouses were not living together at the time of the rape.8 2
These statutes require an evaluation of the state of a relationship or the
existence of a piece of paper to determine whether violent, forced, non-
consensual sex is a crime.
Some states allow prosecution of spouses for rape or other sexual
offenses provided the victims meet stringent reporting requirements. 283
For example, Virginia only allows prosecution for marital rape if the vic-
tim reports the assault within ten days.284 Some states consider marital
278. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 57.
279. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (language exempt-
ing spouses repealed). But see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994) ("A person
commits a felony of first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with another not his
spouse.").
280. Augustine, supra note 119, at 579.
281. See, e.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501(3) (Supp. 1993) (exemption is recognized unless
the couple is living apart, either spouse filed for an annulment, divorce or separate mainte-
nance, or if one spouse has fied for relief under the abuse act); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 464D (1994) (Maryland denies the exemption when the spouses are not living together
under a written separation agreement, or if the spouses have been living apart for more than
three months before the rape); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10H (Michie Supp. 1994) (spouse is
defined as "a legal husband or wife unless the couple is living apart or either husband or wife
has filed for separate maintenance or divorce"); see also Augustine, supra note 119, at 579.
282. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1993) (exemption
applies unless the spouses are living apart); Thx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(2) (West
1994) (marital rape is not a crime unless the spouses are not living together or have filed for
dissolution of the marriage or for separate maintenance).
283. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1994) (the victim must meet reporting
requirements to qualify for protection under the spousal rape statute); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3128 (Supp. 1994) (to overcome the exemption the victim must file a complaint within
90 days of the assault).
284. VA. CODE ANN. § 182-67.2:1 (Michie 1988). See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE 88 262,
264, 799-801 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (marital rape must be reported within 1 year of the
attack).
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rape as a separate, lesser crime than traditional rape.2 85 In Pennsylvania,
even if the spousal sexual assault provision is fully enforced, the maxi-
mum penalty a spouse-rapist would receive is approximately half that of
a stranger-rapist. 86 Clearly this dichotomy sends the message that rape
in marriage is "less bad," and that these women are "second class victims
not worthy of equal protection.'-287
The marital rape exemption has been successfully challenged on
equal protection grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
exemption violates the Fourteenth Amendment since there is no rational
basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape.2 88
However, the response of several state legislatures has been to eliminate
the constitutional violation by expanding the exemption to include un-
married persons. 289 Some states have expanded the exemption to shield
from prosecution men who qualify as social companions,290 such as
dates, or to men who have had sexual relations with their victims within
the previous year.2 91 "These laws expand the scope of the archaic ex-
emption beyond even that envisioned by Lord Hale in the seventeenth
century .... This is indeed a frightening reality for those who value
bodily integrity and personal liberty.'1 92
285. See e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101, 3128 (Supp. 1993) (separate crime of
spousal assault); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -507 (1991) (spousal rape is a class C felony
while rape is a class B felony).
286. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1993) (rape is a first degree felony), 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (Supp. 1993) (spousal sexual assault is a second degree felony), 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (Supp. 1993) (first degree felonies receive a maximum of 20
years while second degree offenses are punishable by a maximum of 10 years). See also VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61, 18.2-67.2:1 (Michie 1993) (the punishment for rape is five years to life,
the punishment for martial sexual assault is one year to 20 years).
287. Judith A. Lincoln, Note, Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First Step in
Protecting Married Women from Spousal Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1219, 1235 (1989)(quoting
Comment, Spousal Sexual Assaula" Pennsylvania's Place on the Sliding Scale of Protection
from Marital Rape, 90 DicK. L. Rav. 777, 796 (1986).
288. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 569 (N.Y. 1984).
289. See e.g., MIN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 1987). Therefore, "[iut is an affirmative
defense to a charge of first degree sexual assault that the [rapist] and victim were married or
[living together] at the time of the [sexual assault]." See Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at
415 n.176 and accompanying text.
290. See eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761,774,775 (1987 & Supp. 1992); MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-511(2) (1993).
291. See generally Schwartz, supra note 31, at 41-42. The effect of this is that consent to
intercourse even once means that the woman becomes sexually bound to that man; lost is her
right not to consent to sexual relations and to have her wishes respected. To Have & To Hold,
supra note 72, at 1260.
292. Augustine, supra note 119, at 581.
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b) The Response of Law Enforcement Agencies
Historically, police department policies and procedures have mini-
mized the criminality of domestic violence and discouraged arrest. 93 An
arrest, if made at all, was conditioned upon evidence of severe and visi-
ble injury. There have also been cases in which police organizations
never responded to domestic abuse calls they received.194 It is important
to recognize that police officers are "vulnerable to the same faulty per-
ceptions and biases about [domestic abuse and marital] rape as is society
at large. '2 95 The root of the problem goes much deeper, however, for
even when they are educated to the realities of domestic violence, many
police officers still refuse to believe that domestic violence is truly a
criminal act necessitating and deserving of legal intervention. 96 Despite
the existence of abuse, some officers may think that preservation of the
family is the law's primary objective.2 97 Other officers "believe that a
man has a right to use force to 'show his wife who's boss.' "298 Male
police officers may even identify with the batterer.2 99 "The batterer's
psychology is more familiar to them than the victim's. Some consciously
or subconsciously perceive parallels in their own lives that lead them to
forgive the husband, as they themselves would wish to be forgiven."30
Although some states and individual police departments have
mandatory arrest policies,3° ' police response, even today, is often insuffi-
cient and ineffective. 0 Some police departments do not view harass-
ment and stalking seriously, which can result in inadequate enforcement
of existing laws.303 Response time to domestic abuse calls is often
greater than that of other cases, due in part to the custom of some of-
293. Waits, supra note 188, at 311.
294. Id. Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975) (the victim called police
because her husband said he was coming over to kill her; the police told her to call them back
once the husband had arrived; the police arrived on the scene only after the next call, which
was made by a neighbor informing the police that the victim had in fact been killed by her
husband).
295. Augustine, supra note 119, at 585-86.
296. See Waits, supra note 188, at 313.
297. Id at 314.
298. Id. at 314.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See Buel, supra note 260, at 214-15 (discussing mandatory arrest, included is a partial
list of states or police departments that have instituted such procedures).
302. See Waits, supra note 188, at 311-16 (addressing police response to domestic distur-
bance calls).
303. See Guy, supra note 7, at 999 n.77 and accompanying text.
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ficers to assign abuse calls a low priority." 4 Most marital rape com-
plaints and domestic abuse calls do not go beyond the investigative
phase.3 °5 Investigating police generally convey to the marital rape vic-
tim, explicitly or implicitly, that an arrest will not result if it is based
solely on her report. 0 6
Rather than arresting the abuser, police frequently assume the role
of mediator30 7 in an attempt to calm the parties.30 8 Some officers use a
victim's agitation as evidence that she is not trustworthy; they then disre-
gard her attempts to tell her story or are skeptical of her version of the
facts.30 9 Many times officers focus on the victim's behavior rather than
the abuser's, to "try to determine how she might have 'provoked' her
husband or how she can control him in the future. '310 Police may mini-
mize the severity of the attack, downplay the abuser's intent to hurt the
victim, or diminish the batterer's responsibility by accepting his excuses
for the violence.31' Often police reports are not filed unless an arrest is
made, thereby leaving no record for future reference.312 If a victim asks
the police to arrest her abuser, officers may pressure her to withdraw the
request or may refuse to honor it, believing that domestic violence vic-
tims never proceed with criminal action; therefore, arrest is pointless.313
Police officers may believe family violence is a private matter into which
304. See Rur OF THumB, supra note 16, at 14 (addressing police response to calls from
victims of domestic abuse); DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 211-12 (domestic distur-
bances given low priority by Detroit police); Waits, supra note 188, at 311 n.250 (survey re-
vealed that Kentucky police did not respond to 17% of all calls for help made by battered
women).
305. Augustine, supra note 119, at 585.
306. Lincoln, supra note 287, at 1223-24.
307. Mediation is an inappropriate response because it fails to hold the abuser accounta-
ble for his criminal actions and also gives him no incentive to change his behavior; as a result,
mediation may contribute to the escalation of violence. ATToRNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FNAL REPORT 23 (1984) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE].
308. See Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 69, at 156 (an officer's primary goal is to pre-
serve the peace, arrest is used as a last resort); DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40, at 207-08
(police unlikely to arrest abuser).
309. Waits, supra note 188, at 311-12.
310. Id. at 312.
311. See id (for example, an abuser's claim that he was drunk). But see ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 768.4 (West 1964) (voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense under the Pro-
tection From Abuse Act).
312. Sewell, supra note 41, at 1008.
313. Waits, supra note 188, at 313.
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the law should not intrude.314 Some officers regard time spent at domes-
tic disturbance calls as time away from preventing "real" crimes. 15
This disparate treatment between domestic violence complaints and
non-domestic violence complaints has devastating consequences. The
United States Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence noted
that "under-enforcement of the law tells victims and assailants alike that
family violence is not really a serious crime, if a crime at all."'3 16 In de-
ciding how to respond to domestic violence calls, the police, and later the
courts, are designating which attacks are to be sanctioned and which are
to be criminalized. 317 Thus, police protection is not absolute, rather it is
"conditional upon women meeting police notions of 'deservedness' and
the circumstances of the attack meeting their definition of 'crime.',,s
In reality, arrest has been shown to be an effective response to do-
mestic violence. Arrest has had a deterrent effect on abusers.3 19 Arrest
removes the abuser from the scene, thus ending at least that episode of
violence. Without an arrest, violence may escalate because abusers are
often angered by police intrusion into their private lives.32 Finally, an
arrest also symbolizes societal condemnation of an abuser's behavior.321
c) The Prosecutorial Response
The marital rape exemption will never be truly abrogated and domes-
tic abuse uniformly punished until prosecutors pursue criminal
charges.3" "[T]he very notion of prosecutorial discretion recognizes the
opportunity for a prosecutor's personal biases about spousal rape to af-
fect his or her decision of whether to prosecute. ''323
314. Id.
315. Id; see also TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 307, at 11 (the crime of
assault is violence between strangers, whereas violence committed against a family member is
a family squabble).
316. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 307, at 12. "It is this widespread
perception that has contributed to the perpetuation of violence within the family." Id.
317. Hanmer, supra note 212, at 6.
318. Id.
319. See Waits, supra note 188, at 302-04.
320. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: TiE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATrERED WOMEN'S MoVEMENT 25 (1982).
321. Waits, supra note 188, at 309.
322. Augustine, supra note 119, at 586.
323. Id Yet, one of a prosecutor's duties is to recognize community values in deciding
which cases to prosecute. Therefore, which bias influences these decisions, the prosecutor's,
society's, or both?
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Some prosecutors claim domestic abuse calls are unduly burdensome
to the judiciary.3 4 Like the police, prosecutors may assign domestic
abuse cases low priority.3z When the parties are related to or have been
involved with each other the rate of criminal prosecution decreases. 326
Prosecutors often pursue lesser crimes than those supported by the vic-
tims' injuries. 27 Prosecutors may "refuse to file based on a general as-
sumption that abused women will not be willing to testify against their
husbands, ' 3 s or that their statements are suspect due to enmity they feel
toward their abusers.329 Greater levels of proof are often required to
support charges of domestic abuse rather than those required in cases of
violence between strangers.3 ° Prosecutors may not pursue marital rape
cases because of the difficulties in getting convictions.331 In fact, some
prosecutors have treated victims of domestic abuse as if they were
criminals.332
Although a majority of states have enacted stalking laws, some pros-
ecutors have questioned their value. For example, one prosecutor has
said that "the law is often an inadequate defense against former lovers
and husbands with a propensity for violence. '333 In some states, first
offenses can only be charged as misdemeanors and conviction is diffi-
cult.334 Because they believe the punishment is too light to have value as
a deterrent, some prosecutors are hesitant to pursue harassment
charges. 33S
324. See RuLE OF TssuMB, supra note 16, at 24 (abuse cases are "extralegal" and put a
strain on the criminal justice system).
325. See id at 93 (spousal abuse complaints are assigned low rank by prosecutors).
326. See Finesmith, supra note 15, at 107 n.192. (citing Barbara Basler, 'Prior' Relations
Cited as a Factor in a Felony Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1982, at BI (discussing a case in which
a pregnant woman was beaten and then burned with a hot iron by her former boyfriend; he
was arrested on a charge of felony assault, but the Manhattan District Attorney's Office re-
duced the charge to a misdemeanor)). Prosecutors view the case as "tainted" when the victim
and defendant have had a prior relationship. Id.
327. See RuLE OF TkucmB, supra note 16, at 31 (the abuser was charged with a misde-
meanor after repeatedly battering his victim with a stick).
328. See Waits, supra note 188, at 322. See, ag., RuLE OF THuMB, supra note 16, at 33.
329. Woods, supra note 19, at 10; Finesmith, supra note 15, at 107.
330. Woods, supra note 19, at 10 (corroborative evidence required is greater in domestic
abuse cases than it is in crimes between strangers).
331. Augustine, supra note 119, at 586.
332. See RuLE OF TmuMB, supra note 16, at 93 (by their disbelief, accusations and de-
meanor, prosecutors' treatment of abuse victims is similar to the treatment of criminal
defendants).
333. Schuyler, supra note 6, at 19 (paraphrasing Deputy District Attorney Rhonda Sand-
ers in California).
334. Id. at 18.
335. Guy, supra note 7, at 999 n.22.
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Despite these obstacles, prosecution is a necessary response to force
husbands and boyfriends to recognize that stalking, marital or acquain-
tance rape, and battering are criminal acts, and offenders will be held
accountable. Further, through prosecutions, the societal attitudes that
impair the ability to secure convictions for domestic abuse cases will
change.336
d) The Response of the Judiciary
While changing perceptions of prosecutors will help to stop abuse,
other arms of the legal system will also have to take steps to recognize
the social problems behind abuse: "Regardless of the scope and depth of
social movements ... social change will not endure unless these move-
ments bring about lasting reforms in our core institutions. This is espe-
cially true of legal institutions, such as the courts, whose decisions affect
so profoundly the operation of the whole of society. ' 337 In addressing
domestic violence, therefore, the role of the judiciary is crucial.
However, some judges and jurors subscribe to the myths and miscon-
ceptions about gender roles and domestic abuse. Judges may inquire
into victim provocation and an abuser's excuses that do not constitute a
legal defense, and may consider them as mitigating factors.338 Following
a conviction, a judge may impose no more than a stem lecture, making
the abuser promise that he will not hurt his wife again.339 On grounds of
preserving family unity, judges have been reluctant to incarcerate abus-
ers.340 Some judges feel the state should not intervene into the home or
believe that domestic violence is an aberration. 341 In addition, believing
that harassment is no more than a minor inconvenience for the victim,
judges may allot little time on their dockets to handle restraining or-
ders.342 Moreover, many judges do not treat spousal rapes with the same
severity as stranger rapes.34 3 All of these conceptions hinder progress
toward eliminating abuse.
336. Augustine, supra note 119, at 586-87.
337. Wilker, supra note 173, at 5. "Many judges ... act in ways to discourage arrest [of
persons who commit family violence] by setting low bail or releasing the assailant on his own
recognizance, or upon conviction, failing to impose a meaningful sanction." TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 307, at 23.
338. Waits, supra note 188, at 327.
339. Id. at 327-28.
340. RULE OF THuMB, supra note 16, at 56-59; see also Waits, supra note 188, at 328.
341. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Sepa-
ration, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 11.
342. Guy, supra note 7, at 999.
343. Augustine, supra note 119, at 588.
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IV. CoNTEMPoRARY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LEGAL NON-
INTERVENTION
Modem day justifications for non-intervention in domestic abuse and
marital rape abound. They include the separate spheres theory, the
preservation of marital harmony, and encouragement of marital har-
mony. Arguments in favor of the marital rape exemption persist even
today.
A. Justifications For Non-Intervention In Marital Rape, Assault And
Battery
1. Separate Spheres Ideology & the Right to Privacy
The legal system has created a distinction 3' between a public realm
of life, which properly is subject to legal or social regulation, and an-
other, fundamentally different, personal sphere, which by its nature is
outside the law or society's authority to regulate.345 This distinction has
been used to justify dissimilar treatment of similar conduct.3" Domestic
issues such as marital rape and battering have been deemed to be in the
private sphere, shielded by the right of privacy. 47 Hence, the law is "un-
able" to offer any protection. A refusal to intervene in marital relation-
ships that involve assault, battery and/or rape preserves the relationship
of domination and subordination.34
In applying the right of privacy to cases involving marital rape and
domestic violence,3" "the right to privacy is claimed by one spouse over
the objection of the other."3 50 In other words, the abuser's right to pri-
vacy is more highly valued than the victim's right to protection, auton-
344. Polan, supra note 229, at 298. There are those who believe that this distinction has
been legitimated through the assertion that it is a "natural," rather than socially imposed
ground for differential treatment. Id.
345. Id.
346. McConnell, supra note 42, at 210 n.14. "When similar conduct is treated differently
by the law based on whether it occurs in the public or in the private sphere, the legitimacy of
the distinction is immediately suspect." Id.
347. Schneider, supra note 169, at 985.
348. McConnell, supra note 42, at 210 n.14 and accompanying text.
349. "The courts, too, have rejected the argument that the marital rape exemption is sup-
ported by the right of marital privacy, citing other intrusions the state makes into domestic
situations." Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 408.
350. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 406. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (the Court recognized the individual's right of privacy as superseding the marital right
of privacy).
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omy, and bodily integrity.3 1 This lack of intervention into domestic
violence cases on the basis of privacy should not be viewed as separate
and distinct from the violence, but rather non-intervention becomes a
part of the violence itself. 2  "Thus the liberal promise of freedom
gained through the private family realm applies only to men, not
women."
353
Protection of privacy that results in the failure to punish a man who
rapes, assaults, or beats his wife, girlfriend, date, or social companion
sends a portentous ideological message to society.354 It devalues wo-
men3 55 and protects male domination. It implies she is his property, and
he as master is free to control her in whatever way he sees fit:3 5 6
That the court will not enter into the marital abode to set rules is
more than a respect for the privacy of the citizens. It is also a
tacit acknowledgement among male judges, male legislators, and
male attorneys (most of whom are husbands) that a husband
should not be told how to treat his wife.357
Reliance on the doctrine of family privacy in the face of domestic abuse
can only be rationalized as an intent to perpetuate male rule.358 In the
end, it is an effective mechanism by which institutional and individual
male power and privilege are maintained and fortified.
2. Preserving Marital Harmony
One of the most often cited justifications for the marital rape exemp-
tion and for non-intervention in cases of domestic abuse is that the state
is fostering marital harmony and intimacy by protecting the privacy of
the marital relationship.35 9 However, there is no harmonious relation-
ship when the woman is being beaten and raped by her husband. Cer-
tainly extending the exemption to include social companions cannot be
construed as protecting a marital relationship.
351. See Schneider, supra note 169, at 974-75; see also Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82,
at 406.
352. Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1665, 1671-72 (1990). "Society is organized to permit
violence in the home; it is organized through images in mass media and through broadly based
social attitudes that condone violence. . . . Society permits such violence to go unchallenged
through the isolation of families and the failure of police to respond." Id. at 1671.
353. Eppler, supra note 227, at 801.
354. Taub & Schneider, supra note 137, at 122-23.
355. Id; Schneider, supra note 169, at 977.
356. Taub & Schneider, supra note 137, at 122-23.
357. KAREN DECROW, SEXIST JusTIcE 166 (1974).
358. Eppler, supra note 227, at 802.
359. To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1268.
[Vol. 78:79
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE STATE
3. Encouraging Reconciliation of Spouses
Even more incredulous is the justification that non-intervention en-
courages the couple to reconcile. This theory posits that even in the face
of rape36 and assault and battery, state intervention into the marital re-
lationship is inappropriate because it will impede a couple's reconcilia-
tion.361 This necessarily leads to the conclusion that the family should be
kept intact at all costs.
B. Arguments Made In Defense Of The Marital Rape Exemption
Coupled with the rationales discussed above, additional grounds are
cited to justify the marital rape exemption.
1. Marital Rape is Not a Serious Problem or is Less Serious Than
Other Rapes
Overall, modem psychologists agree that victims of marital rape suf-
fer long-term harmful effects due to the physical violence, loss of control,
humiliation, and betrayal of trust.362 Marital rape is frequently quite vio-
lent and generally has more severe, traumatic effects on the victim than
other forms of rape.363 Women held hostage to abusive marriages are
often raped on multiple occasions, 3" and frequently these wives are also
battered.365 Allowing a woman who has been raped by her husband to
pursue charges of assault is wholly inadequate.366 As some courts have
understood: "Short of homicide [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of
self.' ,,367 The attitude that marital or date rape is a victimless crime, or a
lesser crime, is to deny the woman who has been raped bodily integrity,
autonomy, and equal protection before the law.
360. "By adhering to the notion that prior consent nullifies the brutality of rape, this view
distorts the reality of such experience for its victims." Id. at 1269.
361. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 405; see also Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221,
223 (Ga. 1985)(discussing historical justifications).
362. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 411.
363. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,575 (N.Y. 1984); see also RUSSELL, supra note 194,
at 190-205.
364. See RussELL, supra note 194, at 111 (in a study of marital rape victims 31% had been
raped once by their husbands; 37% had been raped between 2-20 times; 31% had been raped
more than 20 times).
365. Id. at 90.
366. Liberta, 464 N.E.2d at 574 (the severity of the harm caused by marital rape differenti-
ates it from the crime of assault); see also Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 412 (a hus-
band being charged with assault is not an adequate remedy).
367. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574-75 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,597 (1976)(ci-
tations omitted)).
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2. Women are Vindictive & Will Fabricate Charges
Although the threat of fabricated claims exists for every crime,
"[t]here is no other crime [except marital rape] ... in which all of the
victims are denied protection simply because someone might fabricate a
charge. '368 Differential treatment for women who have been raped by
one other than a stranger reveals a sexist, baseless skepticism of the
credibility of these women, and the presumption that they are somehow
more invidious than other people.3 69 This rationale illustrates that a sig-
nificant element in laws (and attitudes) condoning marital rape is the
"stereotype of women as liars, schemers, troublemakers, and
homebreakers who want to ruin innocent men to suit their own vindic-
tive or irrational ends."370
3. Floodgates Argument
Proponents of the exemption argue that if marital rape is criminal-
ized, the floodgates will open and women will be rushing to charge their
husbands and boyfriends with rape. "This argument that women should
continue to be raped and their husbands should continue to enjoy immu-
nity from prosecution simply because the system is ill-equipped to deal
with the number of prosecutions, reveals the ironic 'solutions' offered to
problems in a patriarchal society."'371
4. Husband's Right to Sexual Relations Without Fear of Prosecution
Another argument for the exemption is that a husband should be
able to have sexual relations with his wife without fear of prosecution.372
"This idea simply confuses marital sex with marital rape. '373 Rape is an
act of violence; an expression of power; a realization of male privilege.374
5. Alternative Remedies are Available
Supporters of the exemption also argue that a criminal courtroom is
not the appropriate forum in which to address the issue of marital rape.
Wives can seek relief in divorce court, thereby obviating the need to
368. Ryder & Kuzemenka, supra note 82, at 405 (quoting Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221,
225 (Ga. 1985)).
369. Augustine, supra note 119, at 576.
370. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 56.
371. Augustine, supra note 119, at 586 n.102.
372. Id. at 577.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 577-78 (citing Carole J. Sheffield, Sexual Terrorism, in WOMFN: A FEMINIST
PERSPECriVE 16 (Jo Freeman ed., 1984)).
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repeal the exemption.375 This argument ignores the fact that rape,
whether committed inside or outside of marriage, is a brutal, violent act,
worthy of criminal punishment and societal condemnation.376
6. Problems of Proof
Another rationale holds that there are evidentiary difficulties in
proving lack of consent in prosecutions of marital rape. This is not a
valid reason to maintain the exemption. Although some might like to
see it happen, it has never been suggested that stranger rape be de-
criminalized "due to the difficulties of proof posed by a consent stan-
dard. ' ' 377 Perhaps a more enlightened approach would be "[r]ather than
decriminalize the behavior, states should inquire into the continuing via-
bility of the consent standard.""37 As one scholar argued, "the purpose
behind the consent rule is not to protect female autonomy and freedom
of choice, but rather to assure men the broadest sexual access to
women."
379
To define rape as excluding marital rape reinforces the doctrine that
holds women are chattel of their husbands or boyfriends.380 If the con-
tinuation of the marital rape exemption protects male property interests,
abrogation of the exemption proclaims and respects women's right to
physical integrity, autonomy, and equality.3 81
V. CONCLUSION
Most, if not all, would agree with the tenet that no one should be
assaulted, beaten, or raped. Yet, when behavior such as this is taken into
the home, somehow this principle gets lost or, at the very least, tainted.
To understand how and why we move from this universal principle to a
rule of law or social practice that legalizes or condones acts contrary to
this ideal, it must be recognized that violence against women is a multi-
faceted issue, implicating a wide range of concepts, some of which in-
clude gender relations, the meaning of equality, and the right to privacy.
America and its institutions were born and nurtured from the vision of
375. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 413. Some have suggested, and rightly so, that
if a husband cannot get his wife's consent he is the one who should seek his remedy through
the courts and not by rape. Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 31, at 54.
376. Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 82, at 413.
377. To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1269.
378. Id. at 1269 n.91.
379. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1122 (1986).
380. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 51.
381. Id.
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men. They are based upon the language men used, with the meaning
men attached to the words and concepts in order to achieve the ends
that were important to men, both as individuals and as members of the
class of men: "This gender bias, if unchallenged, becomes so embedded
in the social structure that it often assumes the form of a social or cul-
tural norm seemingly beyond the purview of the state's responsibility,
rather than a violation of women's human rights for which the state is
accountable. ' '382 Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of domestic vio-
lence must acknowledge and assimilate all the factors involved.
Domestic abuse has always existed. Historically abuse and rape were
endorsed by religion, the legal system, and the controlling members of
society.383 The early rationales employed by the state have been re-
jected. However, new justifications have been formulated. Yet when
each of these rationales is examined, it is apparent that none offers a
cogent basis upon which a state should abdicate its responsibility to pro-
tect its citizens. Either rape, assault, and battery are crimes or they are
not crimes. These brutal acts ought not to be conditioned upon one's
status or non-status as wife, date, or girlfriend. Specifically, it should not
be necessary to evaluate the state of a relationship or the existence of a
piece of paper to determine whether violent, forced, non-consensual sex
is a crime. It is not appropriate for the state to pursue a policy wherein
the family is kept together in the face of violence. Such a policy does not
preserve the sanctity of marriage. Rather it perverts the marriage at is-
sue and the institution of marriage as a whole. Likewise, when the right
to privacy is invoked by the state as a means of allowing men to continue
abusing women, it becomes merely another weapon with which to beat
the woman. Thus, the vision and value of the right to personal privacy
becomes corrupted.
But our legal system has yet to fully recognize women's rights:
"Over the past century, the legal system has rejected some of its most
blatant sexist notions and expressions without ceasing to reinforce male
power and female subordination. ' '381 For example, while it is true that
most legal definitions of rape no longer specifically exclude the husband
who rapes his wife, the exemption lives on, and has in some states been
expanded. Because the responses to and rationales for domestic vio-
lence are couched in different terms, updated by modem rhetoric or sim-
382. Thomas & Beasley, supra note 3, at 39.
383. "Throughout history, ideas about women, the family, and the relationship between
women and the outside world have been effectively used to rationalize inequality and the
inferior status of women." Polan, supra note 229, at 297.
384. See Polan, supra note 229, at 297.
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ply better disguised, there is the perception that there is a commitment
to equality and the rights to bodily integrity and autonomy, which the
criminal justice system and society uphold. What has happened, how-
ever, is that there has been a shift from an overt view of gender relations
and women's separate roles to a more subtle view of limited differ-
ences.3 85 This maintains man's superiority and woman's inferiority both
inside and outside the home. The law perpetuates inequality by sub-
scribing to an ideology that "camouflages the fundamental injustice of
existing sexual relations. 3 8 6  For the legislature, police enforcement
agencies, and judiciary to discriminate against women and among wo-
men is to sanction inequality by legitimizing differential treatment.8 7
Nevertheless, addressing:
domestic violence as merely an issue of equal protection, and by
inference therefore, setting up the treatment of men as the stan-
dard by which we ought to measure the treatment of women in
our societies, may in fact disserve women and mask the ways in
which domestic violence is not just another common crime.388
The continued vitality of domestic violence and the emergence of
new justifications indicate that there is something more at issue beyond
the violent act. The impact of domestic violence is not limited to one
home or relationship.389 Each abusive act and the reaction of the crimi-
nal justice system have ramifications not only for the abuser and the
abused, but also for the members of the affected classes of men and wo-
men. Therefore, domestic abuse not only serves the needs of individual
abusers, it also provides a unique service to men as a class.
Domestic violence (or sexual harassment or gender harassment) and
its justifications survive in order to attain the more expansive result of
male power and privilege with corresponding female powerlessness and
subservience. The responses to domestic abuse, marital rape, and stalk-
ing are evidence of and a mechanism for the continued subordination of
women in our society.390 It is a "violent manifestation of the patriarchal
beliefs that men have the right to dominate [and] control.., women,
385. Taub & Schneider, supra note 137, at 135.
386. 1k at 124. "Because the law purports to be the embodiment of justice, morality, and
fairness, it is particularly effective in performing this ideological function." Id
387. Cf. id. at 135.
388. Thomas & Beasley, supra note 3, at 60.
389. "The violence encountered by people within their families has roots and conse-
quences not confined to those families. When clerks in a local court harass a woman who
applies for a restraining order against the violence in her home, they are part of that vio-
lence." Minow, supra note 352, at 1671.
390. To Have & To Hold, supra note 72, at 1255.
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particularly when those women are, as wives or girlfriends, the 'property'
or 'possession' of men."'39 1 By permitting men to abuse their wives or
girlfriends with impunity, the state condones such behavior, and there-
fore is an accomplice to one of the most fundamental and outrageous
acts of male domination over women in contemporary society.39
In the end, while we can all agree in the abstract with the universal
principle with which this conclusion began, that is that no one should be
assaulted, beaten, or raped, in reality, violence against women, and in
particular domestic violence, is simply too valuable a tool to relinquish.
391. Eppler, supra note 227, at 791 n.14; see generally DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 40;
see also MARTIN, supra note 191.
392. Eppler, supra note 227, at 790.
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